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ARGUMENT 
I. DRAPER CITY'S PROPOSED STANDARD OF REVIEW IGNORES THE 
STATUTE 
Draper City urges this Court to interpret the "arbitrary and capricious" standard 
of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 ("Section 1001") to mean "reasonably debatable." 
(Brief of Appellee, pp. 12, 15.) Draper City has pulled this standard from Smith 
Investment Co. v. Sandv City, 958 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1998), and alleges that it is 
supported by land-use case law which differentiates between administrative and 
legislative decisions. As argued in Harmon's Brief, Smith Investment is inapplicable 
because it was not decided under Section 1001. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 18-19.) 
Further, the land-use case law cited by Draper City all pre-dates Section 1001, which 
was enacted in 1991. In essence, Draper City would have this Court rule as if Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-101 et seq. ("Chapter 9") had never been recodified and Section 
1001 never enacted. The Court should not be persuaded. 
The pre-existing case law under Chapter 9 is simply not clear. In some cases, 
the "reasonably debatable" standard of judicial review was applied to a city council's 
zoning decisions. See Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh FloraL 545 
P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976). However, in one zoning case this standard was rejected and a 
higher "arbitrary and capricious" standard was imposed. See Gibbons & Reed 
Company v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967). Some cases explicitly 
interpreted the phrase "arbitrary and capricious" to mean "substantial basis in fact." 
See Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988), cert, den., 765 
1 
See Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988), cert, den., 765 
P.2d 1278 (1988). Other cases used these terms to affirm land use decisions without 
engaging in a review of the evidence at all. See Navlor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 
410 P.2d 764 (Utah 1966). 
As pointed out in Harmon's Brief, if the legislature had wanted the 
"reasonably debatable" standard to apply, it could have said so in Section 1001. (Brief 
of Appellant, p. 20.) By the same token, if it had wanted the courts to continue to 
apply the standard as they had been, the legislature could have left this issue alone. But 
it did not. Instead, the legislature silenced the cacophony of the prior case law by 
providing one standard for all land use decisions, "arbitrary, capricious or illegal," 
when it recodified Chapter 9 and enacted Section 1001. 
Certainly this phrase was deliberately chosen. It is used elsewhere in Chapter 9, 
and has been defined and construed to mean "supported by substantial evidence." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708 ("Section 708"); Wells v. Board of Adjustment. 936 P.2d 
1102, 1105 (Utah App. 1997).l This Court has already construed the "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard under Section 1001 and held that it requires "evidence...adequate 
to convince a reasonable mind to support the decision." Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of 
1
 Draper City argues that if "arbitrary and capricious" means the same 
thing in both Sections 1001 and 708, the separate provisions would be redundant. 
Harmon's submits that, in construing statutes, courts should guard against contradictory 
interpretations rather than harmless redundancies. Moreover, it is not redundant for the 
legislators to clarify that the same standard of review applies to land use decisions by 
municipalities (Section 1001) and boards of adjustment (Section 708), especially in light 
of the prior inconsistent case law. 
2 
Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah App. 1998). In construing Section 1001 fs 
arbitrary and capricious standard, the Court's primary focus should be on the statute 
and cases decided under it—not the confusing and inconsistent case law prior to its 
enactment. 
II. IT IS REASONABLE TO REQUIRE LAND-USE DECISIONS TO BE 
SUPPORTED BY FACTS IN THE RECORD. 
Contrary to Draper City's contentions, the cases cited by Harmon's support the 
idea that land-use decisions must be supported by facts in the record. In Gibbons & 
Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City. 431 P.2d 559, 563 (Utah 1967), the Utah Supreme 
Court found "sufficient evidence in the record" in support of overturning a zoning 
ordinance enacted by North Salt Lake. The Supreme Court engaged in this analysis 
after noting defendant's arguments that "zoning is a legislative function" subject to a 
"reasonably debatable" standard. Gibbons & Reed. 431 P.2d at 562. 
In Kanfer v. Montgomery County Council. 373 A.2d 5, 11-20 (Md.App. 1977), 
the city council denied a rezoning application, contrary to the recommendation of a 
hearing examiner. In pronouncing the standard of review, the court ruled that even the 
fairly debatable standard required that the decision under review be supported by 
substantial evidence in the record: 
On an appeal from the grant or denial by the legislative body of an 
application for a zoning reclassification, the function of the reviewing 
court in Maryland is indeed restricted and the "fairly debatable" rule is 
applicable. Otherwise stated, the appellate court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the zoning body and should affirm when the latter ys 
decision is supported by substantial evidence....a zoning application may 
3 
be reversed by an appellate court when the action appealed from is shown 
to be "arbitrary, capricious or illegal." 
Kanfer, 373 A.2d at 12 (emphasis added). Then, just as Harmon's requests in this 
case, the court examined each reason given by the city council to see if it was 
supported by evidence in the record. Id. at 13-16. Because the reasons were not 
supportable-indeed the evidence called for the granting of the rezoning application-the 
court held that the city council's decision was arbitrary and capricious. 
Even in one of the cases cited by Draper City, the court examined the record for 
"findings of fact supported by substantial evidence" when reviewing a "legislative" 
decision. Sparks v. Douglas County. 904 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1995). In Sparks, 
after pronouncing the standard quoted by Draper City (Brief of Appellee, p. 15.), the 
Washington Supreme Court upheld a decision by county commissioners which was 
based on traffic studies, current road widths, and well-documented findings. The court 
concluded: "Because its determination [the county commission's] was made upon 
honest and due consideration of substantial evidence, it was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious." Sparks, 904 P.2d at 743 (emphasis added). 
Appellee's position that it is "absurd" to apply a substantial evidence measure 
(Brief of Draper City, p. 17) is simply not well taken. In addition to the cases cited 
above, land use disputes implicating the First Amendment also require courts to 
examine facts in the record in order to determine whether restrictions on speech are 
necessary to serve a significant government interest. For example, in Renton v. 
4 
Playtime Theatres. Inc.. 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), a 
municipality passed a zoning ordinance banning "adult" theaters from zones around 
churches, parks, schools, etc. In response to the argument that the proffered 
justifications were "conclusory and speculative," the Supreme Court examined the 
record and found that the municipality relied on "studies," and "detailed findings" of 
fact. Renton. 89 L.Ed.2d at 39-40. See also, Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 491 US 
781, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661, 675 (1989) (where, in upholding sound 
restrictions on public concerts, the Supreme Court referred to evidence in the record 
about the affects of sound amplification). 
Certainly Harmon's is not asking this Court to subject the City Council's 
decision to "strict scrutiny." But the cases cited above illustrate a point: requiring a 
factual basis for zoning decisions does not constitute undue judicial interference into the 
legislative process. Of course the City Council may impose restrictions on how 
Harmon's uses its own property. Under Section 1001, however, these restrictions must 
have some factual basis beyond merely the "subjective opinions" of the City Council 
Members. (See Brief of Appellee, p. 17.) 
Ill- THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT SUPPORTS THE 
DECISION OF THE CITY COUNCIL 
Beginning on Page 19 of its Brief, Draper City argues that the record contains 
evidence that would support a denial of Harmon's rezoning application. However, 
Draper City does not cite to any facts in the record. Instead, it points out that the City 
5 
Council was not legally obligated to follow the recommendation of the Planning 
Commission; that Draper's general plan, which allows for Harmon's proposed zoning, 
is only an advisory guideline; and that the City Council heard both sides of the issue. 
In other words, as long as the proper process is followed and the municipality does not 
offend any existing statutes or regulations, its decision is not "arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal." This interpretation goes too far. Harmon's recognizes the judicial deference 
and the presumption of validity that must be afforded to a city council's rezoning 
decision under Section 1001. However, these decisions must be supported by some 
evidence in the record. 
. The case before the City Council could not have "gone either way." (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 11.) The tally of the vote (3-2) and the level of "public clamor" are 
largely irrelevant. Still, Draper City argues that because the City Council's action was 
supported by public opinion, its decision was appropriate. Under this theory, judicial 
review is almost reduced to review of an opinion poll. The public clamor doctrine 
guards against this: although public views should be considered by a city council, they 
cannot be the sole basis for a decision. See Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 
704, 711 (Utah App. 1988), cert, den., 765 P.2d 1278 (1988). In this case, the only 
basis for the City Council's decision was the "not in my back yard" sentiment voiced 
by some neighboring residents. Three City Council members caved into this sentiment 
and reasoned that the proposed development was "not compatible" with the existing 
neighborhood. As the court held in Kanfer, this is not sufficient. See Kanfer, 373 
6 
A.2d at 13-14. Under Section 1001, in making a decision that will restrict an owner's 
use of its property, a municipality must have a factual basis for its action. 
Here, there simply is no factual basis. In its Brief, Harmon's identified each of 
the reasons given by the City Council, examined the relevant parts of the record, and 
established that these reasons were unsupported by facts in the record. (Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 23-27.) Draper City has not responded to this analysis or disputed its 
conclusions.2 Harmon's is not asking the Court to choose one alternative among a 
number of reasonable outcomes, and this litigation is not about how much evidence 
constitutes "substantial evidence." The evidence in the record leads to only one 
reasonable conclusion: Harmon's rezoning application should be approved. The City 
Council's decision is not supported by any facts in the record.3 
CONCLUSION 
Simply put, Section 1001 's arbitrary and capricious standard requires a factual 
basis in the record for rezoning decisions. All the facts in the record demonstrate that 
the development is compatible with the existing neighborhood and that the rezoning 
application should have been approved. For this reason, the Court should reverse the 
2
 Indeed, the evidence relied upon by Harmon's consists largely of studies 
conducted, and conclusions drawn, by Draper City's own experts: the Planning 
Commission and its Staff. See Addendums C, D, E, and F to Appellant's Brief. 
3
 In this regard, contrary to Draper City's assertions, Kanfer and Bentley v. 
Valco. Inc., 741 P.2d 1266 (Colo. App. 1987), are instructive. Even under the 
language articulated by those courts, "overwhelming evidence to the contrary" and "no 
competent evidence," the City Council's decision in this case cannot stand. 
7 
District Court's decision to award summary judgment to Draper City, and direct the 
District Court to grant Harmon's Motion for Summary Judgment and enter an order 
requiring the City Council to approve Harmon's re-zoning and conditional use 
application. J 
DATED this ^ ^ ~ d a y of July, 1999. 
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